are replete with statistics and recommendations regarding juveniles, juvenile detentions, and the criminal justice system. The data in this 1911 Report suggest several avenues for further research using the 1911 database in conjunction with these homicide files.¹⁸²

Mayor Busse was defeated after one term, and the reform efforts apparently diminished after his regime ended. 183

The 1915 Chicago City Council Report of Crime

Following the 1911 Chicago Vice Commission, the 1915 Chicago City Council Report was even more ambitious and sophisticated, a path–breaking effort to describe patterns in crime, especially juvenile crime, and to use that analysis for public policy recommendations. ¹⁸⁴

The Chicago City Council Report¹⁸⁵ is noteworthy today for its scope and broad policy agenda. The Report includes information on arrest patterns, dispositions, descriptive statistics on juvenile defendants and probation, and reports on professional criminals and the re-

They [the reformers] had no theory at all—nothing but wrath, experience, common Chicago sense, and newspapers ready to back reform, not for the news, but for the common good. Theories they had tried; and exposures, celebrated trials, even some convictions of boodlers. They had gone in for a civil service reform law, and, by the way, they got a good one, probably the best in any city in the country. But exposes are good only for one election; court trials may punish individuals, but even convictions do not break up a corrupt system; and a "reform law" without reform citizenship is like a ship without a crew. With all their 'reforms,' bad government persisted. There was that bear garden—the City Council; something ought to be done to that

STEFFENS, supra note 15.

¹⁸² For example, the 1911 Vice Commission Report lists the number of houses of prostitution in each police precinct by precinct number. A number of homicide reports in this data set include precinct number, and could be matched with precincts with large or small numbers of houses of prostitution to see whether homicides were less, or greater in those districts with a large number of houses of prostitution, or whether there was an absence of reporting of homicides in some periods in those districts. Or, to test the extent of the absence of law enforcement or the effect of "closing" the segregated vice district, the number of homicides, or the number of arrests and convictions for murder or manslaughter before, during or after the official closing could be compared. *See* The VICE COMM'N OF CHI., *supra* note 6, tbls. I–V, 357–61.

 $^{^{183}}$ This is how a contemporaneous observer described late nineteenth century reform efforts in Chicago:

The 1915 Chicago City Council Report includes extensive statistics and tables on various kinds of crime from 1905 until 1913, and an extensive bibliography. The Report includes statistics comparing murder and other offenses with similar offenses in New York City and London. This Report lists 262 murders in Chicago for the year 1913, in comparison to 131 for New York during the year and 36 for London for the same year. MERRIAM, *supra* note 166, at 9.

¹⁸⁵ See Merriam, supra note 166.

lationship between crime and prostitution. ¹⁸⁶ Some analytic categories would not be included today, but the systematic data on age, gender, offense, disposition, and other fundamental demographic and criminal justice events such as arrests and convictions are important contributions. The interlocking corruption of city government officials, the judiciary, and the police continued to preoccupy reformers. ¹⁸⁷

The 1915 Chicago City Council Report surveyed the entire criminal justice system, especially as it affected juveniles, including juvenile detention, arrest patterns and conviction patterns, parole, incarceration, with extensive statistics and detailed descriptions of crimes and circumstances to back up their recommendations and conclusions. Not surprisingly, the findings included the finding of corruption and graft in the agencies of criminal justice. The Report focused more on lawyers and city officials than did the 1911 Report.

By becoming political powers, they [organized crime leaders] have been able not only to secure immunity for themselves, but in a large measure to make our city government itself a partner in crime. Their feudal tenure of office and their Warwick-like power to make and unmake political candidates and to control the policies of the city government has been astounding. The careers of the captains of our professional gunmen have been much longer than those of any of our political representatives, our mayors, our chiefs of police, or even of our college presidents.

Andrew Bruce, *Introduction in* THE ILL. ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, *supra* note 96, at 815.

188 The report summarizes:

Summary of Findings. . . . The treatment of crime in Chicago is wholly inadequate in that: Many professional criminals escape the penalties of the law and prey at will upon society. . . . The police and criminal justice statistics in Chicago are wholly incomplete and are not even assembled or published by any authority. . . . Professional criminals have built up a system which may be called a 'crime trust,' with roots running through the police force, the bar, the bondsmen, the prosecutor's office, and political officials.

MERRIAM, supra note 166, at 9-10.

¹⁸⁹ The report notes:

We find collusion between members of the detective force and professional criminals. Graft, favoritism, and political influence tend strongly toward a demoralization of the police force, and particularly the detective branch of service . . . We find a close connection between alcoholism, 'dope,' prostitution, gambling, and crime.

Id. at 10.

¹⁹⁰ The report further notes:

There is a group of criminal lawyers whose work includes dealing with the police, furnishing professional alibis and professional witnesses, jury fixing, spiriting away of witnesses, exhaus-



¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., Edith Abott, Statistics Relating to Crime in Chicago, in The Ill. Ass'n for Criminal Justice, supra note 96, at 17–88f, 46–59, 73–78, 88a; Morgan L. Davies & Fletcher Dobyns, Description and Analysis of Criminal Conditions, in The Ill. Ass'n for Criminal Justice, supra note 96, at 153–96, 172–74, 195–96.

¹⁸⁷ The report notes:

Some of their findings replicate the concerns of those now working to reform the criminal justice system. The police were implicated in the reports of graft and corruption. The allegations and graft and corruption among the police which came to the attention of the Committee were referred to the State's Attorney and resulted in at least some prosecutions. This was a period when investigative grand juries took the lead in reform efforts.

The City Council Report in 1915 was followed after World War I by the even more ambitious Illinois Crime Survey in 1929. The establishment of the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice for the purpose of conducting the Survey was another collaboration of law enforcement, the private bar, and the citizens of Chicago. 196

tive continuances, and all the underground activity of all around 'fixers.' . . . Appointment in the office of City Prosecutor and State's Attorney are made on a political basis; hence the permanent appointment of expert prosecutors is made impossible.

Id.

¹⁹¹ "Thousands of innocent persons are annually imprisoned in the County Jail, many of them under disgraceful conditions, tending to create criminals. . . . The present machinery catches poor, petty and occasional criminals, and punishes them severely, but fails signally to suppress the professional criminal." Id. at 9–10.

"Police organization and methods are wholly inadequate to deal with the crime situation in Chicago, assuming the integrity of all members of the force. Incompetence, lack of discipline, and aggressiveness are noticeable on a large scale." *Id.* at 11.

¹⁹³ See Morgan L. Davie, Report of Attorney for Committee: Findings and Recommendations, in MERRIAM, supra note 166, at 161:

There has, however, been presented to this Committee, testimony to show that certain members of the Detective Bureau were in active collusion with various classes of criminals and that in some cases, not only were the proceeds of crime divided, but criminals were forced to ply their occupations, that the corrupt officials might have their plunder. There is every reason to believe that this system has been in existence for a great many years. As a result of the disclosure of this Committee and the indictments by the state's attorney, this system has been greatly checked and large numbers of professional criminals have left Chicago. . . . The corrupt officials heretofore referred to, maintained their power over the criminal world by the method of arresting the criminal, who refused to obey orders or divide the plunder, and holding them in custody under shocking physical surroundings and refusing to bring them before a court for fixing of bonds and admission to bail.

¹⁹⁴ "In May, 1911, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad inquisitorial powers of grand juries." RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 223 (1963).

 195 See The Ill. Ass'n for Criminal Justice , supra note 96.

196 Haller notes:

The decision to found the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice and undertake a survey of crime and criminal justice was made by the state's most prestigious civic leaders in a period when a breakdown of law and order appeared to have reached crisis proportions. By 1924, the beer wars between bootlegging gangs were open and notorious, as rival gangs publicly shot each other while the police and courts were unable or unwilling to intervene to restore law and order. . . . By the early summer of 1925, the members of the Illinois State Bar Association, on the